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ARTICLES
HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH SPECIES: CAN
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW
SAVE THE NORTH
ATLANTIC SWORDFISH?
KAREN

L.

SMITH*

INTRODUCTION

The oceans cover approximately 71 % of the earth's surface. 1
This vast area provides the human race with transport, recreation,
minerals, fuels, and a source of food. 2 However, as the population
of the earth explodes,3 it becomes more difficult for the ocean to
continue providing us with these resources. In fact, many of the
resources which are most valuable to humans may be exhausted if
they are not regulated carefully. Ocean fisheries 4 are an important
example of such a resource.
Fisheries provide the population of the world with a much
needed source of food. In many countries, fish serve as the primary
source of protein in the populations' diet, and are thus necessary for
vital sustenance. Concern about the future of fisheries has in

* Candidate for Masters of Law in International Environmental Law, George
Washington University Law School; J.D., 1998, Western New England College School
of Law; B.S. with Highest Honors, 1995, University of Maine at Orono. A portion of
this Article was written while serving as an academic intern with the Highly Migratory
Fish Species Division of the National Marine Fisheries Service in 1998.
1. See PETER WEBER, ABANDONED SEAS: REVERSING TIIE DECLINE OF TIIE
OCEANS 7 (1993).
2. See PATRICIA w. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TIIE
ENVIRONMENT 251 (1992).
3. The world population at the beginning of the century was only 1.6 billion. By
the end of the century, it will have exploded to more than 6 billion people. Human
numbers are growing at an astonishing rate of 88 million annually. See Christopher
Flavin, The Legacy of Rio, in STATE OF TIIE WORLD 1997, at 3, 16 (Linda Starke ed.
1997).
4. The term "fishery" is defined as the business of catching, processing, or selling
fish harvested from the ocean. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 636 (6th ed. 1990).
5
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creased as the limits of the resource's exploitability are being
tested. Amid the concern for the resource lies a question that has
been debated for decades: who should benefit from the ocean's
fishery resource, and more importantly, who has the right to extract
those resources from the ocean?5
This question poses a special problem when dealing with the
parts of the ocean that are not under exclusive control of any state. 6
In 1949, State Department official Walter Chapman noted that "fish
caught on the high seas . . . were taken from international com
mons, and those resources belonged to no one until their capture."7
At that time, there were no laws that controlled unlimited fishing
on the high seas, and \vith the increase in fishery technology, a great
strain was placed on the world's fisheries. s
Today, the strain on fisheries continues. Conservation meas
ures have been taken to protect certain species and to regulate fish
ing on the high seas. However, problems with over-exploitation
remain. One such problem occurs when highly migratory species of
fish are involved. Highly migratory species create a special prob
lem in the fishery industry because they migrate in and out of the
high seas, and thus in and out of the exclusive economic zones of
various states. 9 The question of conservation then becomes ex
tremely difficult, and will require international cooperation to en
sure that over-exploitation of the species does not occur.
The regulation of swordfish and other highly migratory species
takes place through international documents, such as the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,lO the 1966 Inter
5. See H. GARY KNIGHT, MANAGING THE SEA'S LIVING RESOURCES: LEGAL AND
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES 13-29 (1977). The debate about the ap
propriation of ocean fishery resources has been ongoing since before the 15th century,
when England became concerned about excluding foreign fisherman in coastal waters,
and continued through the extended navigation of the worlds oceans, the effort of Spain
and Portugal to reduce the Atlantic and Indian oceans to the status of lakes in the 16th
century, the declaration of the concept of "freedom of the high seas" by domestic and
international courts in the 18th century, and the development of international law and
the creation of boundaries on the ocean. See id.
6. The term "state" is used in this Article to refer to a nation state.
7. LAWRENCE JUDA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCEAN USE MANAGEMENT: THE
EVOLUTION OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE 116 (1996).
8. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 2, at 490.
9. See Will Martin, Fisheries Conservation and Management of Straddling Stocks
and Highly Migratory Stocks Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 765, 767 (1995).
10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
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national Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas,11 and
most recently, the 1995 United Nations Conference on Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.12 Domestically, the
regulation of swordfish is implemented through the Atlantic Tunas
Conservation Act 13 and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conserva
tion and Management Act.1 4 This Article will analyze each of the
above-listed management policies, implicate their strengths and
weaknesses, and discuss proposed international and domestic policy
changes to help conserve and manage the North Atlantic swordfish.
Part I analyzes the past and present conditions of the North Atlan
tic swordfish stock. Part II presents an overview of how interna
tional regulations have attempted to set up a management regime
for highly migratory fish species through the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1966 International Con
vention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. Part III discusses
the Atlantic Tunas Conservation Act and the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act as the United States
domestic laws that regulate swordfish. Part IV analyzes the 1995
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Fmally, Part V pro
poses recommendations for the future regulation of the North At
lantic swordfish stock.
1.

SWORDFISH AS A HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH: PAST AND
PRESENT CONDITIONS OF THE STOCK

To fully understand the unique problems that fisheries face,
one must first look to the history of the stock and then compare
that history to the present outlook. Swordfish are classified as a
highly migratory fish because they migrate between the area of the
high seas and the exclusive economic zones of various states. 15 This
analysis will show how domestic and international protection of the
stock is vital for its long-term survival.
Swordfish can grow to be a maximum of 445 centimeters in
11. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, opened for
signature May 14, 1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 [hereinafter Tuna Convention].
12. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened
for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 [hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement].
13. 16 U.S.C. §§ 971-97.1i (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
14. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1801-1882 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
15. See Martin, supra note 9, at 767.
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length, and can weigh up to 1,200 pounds. 16 Swordfish inhabit most
of the world's tropical and temperate oceansP Equipped with
adapted specialized eyes18 that enable them to seek prey at great
depths, swordfish feed principally at night on squid, herring, mack
erel, tuna, and other fish. 19 Their sword-like bills allow them to
slash their prey, and their sleek body contours enable them to
achieve great speed. 20
North Atlantic swordfish inhabit the Atlantic Ocean, including
the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. 21 The United States'
Atlantic commercial swordfish industry, which harvests the North
Atlantic swordfish, is believed to have been established in the early
19th century as a harpoon fishery off the coast of New England. 22
Until 1962, fishing was confined to the area between New York and
Canada, and virtually all swordfish caught were harpooned. 23 How
ever, beginning in the 1960s swordfish were targeted by longline
vessels. 24 Longlines are dragged behind vessels, stretch for tens of
miles, and are covered with thousands of hooks.25 Thus, longlines
allow fisherman to catch a number of fish at one time, as they do
not need to rely solely on fish banking on the surface. 26 In fact,
longlines catch almost 98% of the United States' commercial
swordfish caught in the North Atlantic. 27 The most prevalent prob
lem occurring with longline harvesting is the indiscriminate nature
of the lines. The lines cannot focus on one species, nor can they
focus on the maturity level of the species caught. This results in
what is called a "by-catch."28 The by-catch consists of not just ma
ture swordfish, but juvenile swordfish, various other fish species,
16. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, DRAFT FISHERY MANAGEMENT
PLAN FOR ATLANTIC TUNAS, SWORDFISH, AND SHARKS INCLUDING AN ENVIRONMEN
TAL ASSESSMENT AND REGULATORY IMPACT REvIEW 6-80 (1998) [hereinafter DRAFT
FMPj.
17. See id. at 6-79.
18. Swordfish have specially adapted eye muscles that produce heat and work to
maintain brain and visual function, allowing them to hunt at great depths and frigid
temperatures. See id. at 5-36.
19. See id. at 6-79.
20. See id. at 5-35 to -36.
21. See id. at 6-79.
22. See id. at 5-36.
23. See id. at 5-37.
24. See id.
25. See J. Madeleine Nash, The Fish Crisis, TIME, Aug. 11,1997, at 65.
26. See DRAFT FMP, supra note 16, at 5-59.
27. See id. at 5-38.
28. See MICHAEL BERRILL, THE PLUNDERED SEAS: CAN THE WORLD'S FISH BE
SAVED? 62 (1997).
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sea turtles, albatrosses, and sharks. 29 Harpoon harvesting, at the
very least, served to sustain the fisheries as only mature fish that
had already had the time to spawn were taken. 30
Recently, domestic landings of commercially viable swordfish
have declined steadily in the North Atlantic and elsewhere. On the
East Coast, landings of swordfish have declined from around ten
million pounds in the late 1980s to only about six million pounds in
1995.31 On the West Coast, around Hawaii, the decline in the
number of swordfish landings is said to have been the major factor
in the 27% decrease in the overall fishery harvest between 1993 and
1994 alone. 32 In addition to the swordfish landed domestically, a
large amount of swordfish is imported into the United States for
consumption. In 1997, the United States imported 15.5 metric tons
of swordfish from thirty-three different countries. 33 This is esti
mated to be about three times the amount of swordfish produced
domestically in 1996 on the East and West Coasts combined. 34
The large amount of swordfish imported into the United States
evidences the international character of the swordfish industry.
The international character is further shown by the fact that sword
fish are highly migratory species and travel over large distances,
both in and out of the exclusive economic zones of states and in the
areas of the high seas as well.35 Thus, the sustainable management
of the swordfish industry depends on the effective cooperation of
all countries harvesting them. 36
II.

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

The international community has attempted to regulate fisher
ies through the use of treaty provisions and through the use of do
mestic regional fishery management programs. Traditionally, the
law relating to the sea has been split into two categories of focus:
the territorial seas and the high seas.37 The territorial seas are the
29. See DRAFT FMP, supra note 16, at 5-58 to -59.
30. See id. at 5-36 to -37.
31. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Swordfish in the North Atlantic: The
Case for Conservation (visited Mar. 12, 1999) <http://www.nrdc.org.nrdc.nrdcpro/water/
nasfrep.htmi> [hereinafter NRDC].
32. See Michael Travis, Economic Interactions Between U.S. Longline Fisheries
(visited Mar. 7, 1999) <http://www.soest.hawaii.eduIPFRP/travis.htmi>.
33. See DRAFT FMP, supra note 16, at 5-42 to -43.
34. See id.
35. See Martin, supra note 9, at 767.
36. See id.
37. See Julie R. Mack, International Fisheries Management: How the U.N. Confer

10

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:5

designated areas along the coastlines of states where the states have
complete jurisdiction and control; this includes control over all fish
ing rights. 38 The high seas are the area beyond the territorial seas
over which no state has contro1. 39 Traditionally, the high seas were
never regulated for fisheries management. 40
In order to regulate the high seas, which were traditionally
considered open to all states, there must be cooperation among all
fishing nations. Fishing nations can be comprised of both coastal
nations and those nations which are landlocked but have substantial
enough fishing fleets to have a high seas fishery.41 These land
locked nations are referred to as distant water fishing nations
("DWFNs") and have different interests in the management of
highly migratory fish stocks than do coastal states. 42 Often, these
nations want to keep the high seas free from regulation by coastal
states in order to protect their right to exploit straddling and highly
migratory fish stocks. 43 Coastal states control the resources in their
coastal waters and can thereby regulate the fisheries found there. 44
Coastal states, therefore, have a direct economic interest in control
ling any species found in their domestic waters, or which migrate in
and out of those waters, whereas DWFNs may be interested only in
the short-term economic benefit received from exploiting the stock.
Therefore, coastal states and DWFNs have competing views over
what type of fishery regulation should be implemented.
In 1958, the First Geneva Conference of the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS I") took place. 45 The conference produced four sepa
rate treaties relating to the law of the sea: the Convention on the
High Seas;46 the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
ence on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Changes the Law of Fishing on the
High Seas, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 313, 315 (1996).
38. See id.; see also Oda Shigeru, Fisheries Under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 739, 739 (1983).
39. See Mack, supra note 37, at 315.
40. See Jon L. Jacobson, International Fisheries Law in the Year 2010, 45 LA. L.
REV. 1161, 1170 (1985).
41. See Mack, supra note 37, at 316.
42. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Modifying the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: New
Initiatives on Governance of High Seas Fisheries Resources: The Straddling Stocks Nego
tiations, 10 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 219, 221 (1995).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. 1 D. P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 22 (I. A. Shearer
ed.1982).
46. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention].
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Zone;47 the Convention on the Continental Shelf;48 and the Con
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas. 49 UNCLOS I left the high seas open to all nations and
gave all coastal and non-coastal states the freedom to fish on the
high seas. 50 In addition, UNCLOS I gave coastal states sovereign
rights to natural resources over its continental shelf. 51
Most importantly, the Convention on Fishing and Conserva
tion of Living Resources of the High Seas ("Fishery Convention")
provided that states engaged in fishing for the same stock on the
high seas shall enter into an agreement with one another to adopt
necessary measures for the conservation of those stocks. 52 The
Fishery Convention also provided that if a state had a special inter
est in maintaining stocks in the high seas adjacent to its territorial
sea, it could adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropriate
to any stock of fish provided that negotiations with the other con
cerned states had not produced an agreement within six months.53
However, under UNCLOS I, the state was not allowed to adopt
such measures unless there was an urgent need for conservation,
the measures were based on scientific findings, and the measures
would not discriminate in form or fact against foreign fisherman. 54
In 1960, a second Geneva Conference was held to reach an
agreement on the extent of the territorial sea. 55 Nonetheless, no
compromise was reached and the states began to unilaterally estab
lish six mile territorial seas and six mile fishery zones. 56 The 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS
111")57 was formed not to address territorial limits, but to address
47. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for sig
nature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Territorial Sea
Convention].
48. Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter Continental Shelf Convention].
49. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138,559 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter
Fishery Convention].
50. See High Seas Convention, supra note 46, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450
U.N.T.S. at 82.
51. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 48, art. 2(1), 15 U.S.T. at 473,
499 U.N.T.S. at 313, 315.
52. See Fishery Convention, supra note 49, art. 4, 17 U.S.T. at 140, 559 U.N.T.S.
at 288.
53. See id. art. 7, 17 U.S.T. at 141, 559 U.N.T.S. at 290.
54. See id. art. 7, 17 U.S.T. at 141-42, 559 U.N.T.S. at 292.
55. See O'CONNELL, supra note 45, at 24.
56. See id.
57. UNCLOS III, supra note 10.
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the question of access to mineral resources. 58 However, only a mi
nority of states were interested due to the fact that few would actu
ally benefit from such an agreement. 59 Therefore, the Convention
chose to instead adopt drastic proposals which would renovate all
of the Geneva Conventions. 60
In the period between UNCLOS I, in 1958, and UNCLOS III,
in 1982, an agreement was formed between states that had a com
mon interest in maintaining the populations of tuna and tuna-like
species existing in the Atlantic Ocean. This agreement was the
1966 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas;61 it was the first international agreement to have an impact
on the conservation and management of the North Atlantic sword
fish. However, there are many weaknesses in both the provisions of
the Convention and the powers of the commission which it estab
lished to carry out its objectives.
A.

Regulation of Fisheries Under the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNCLOS III was the first major international instrument that
attempted to set out jurisdictional and regulatory issues for fishery
resources in the sea. 62 For the most part, UNCLOS III was a codifi
cation of customary international law and sought to "promote the
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient
utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living re
sources, and the study, protection, and preservation of the marine
environment."63
1.

Fishery Management Under UNCLOS III

UNCLOS III divided the waters off of coastal states into the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
("EEZ"), and the high seas. The territorial seas were extended to
12 nautical miles64 from shore,65 the contiguous zone extended to
58. See O'CONNELL, supra note 45, at 25.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Thna Convention, supra note 11.
62. See O'CONNELL, supra note 45, at 25.
63. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10,21 I.L.M. at 1271; see also Suzanne Iudicello,
Protecting Global Marine Biodiversity, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW 120, 124 (Wil
liam J. Snape III ed. 1996).
64. A "nautical mile" is used to measure distance on the ocean and stretches
6,080 feet, as opposed to a statutory mile of 5,280 feet, which is regularly used to mea
sure distances. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 992 (6th ed. 1990).
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24 nautical miles,66 and the EEZs extended coastal state control to
a maximum of 200 nautical miles from shore. 67 Since over 90% of
the world's commercial fisheries are contained within 200 nautical

miles of the coasts, a vast amount of previously unregulated fisher
ies were suddenly under state regulation. 68 This change impacted
the DWFNs by forcing them out of their traditional fishing areas
and into the area of the high seas, where fishing is less regulated
and not under the control of anyone state. 69
Within the EEZ, a coastal state has exclusive rights to explore,
manage, and exploit living and non-living resources.7° These rights
give the state the exclusive power to set quotas in the form of total
allowable catch limits on the amount of living resources which can
be taken from its EEZ.71 However, UNCLOS III also requires the
state to take into account the best scientific data available in order
to ensure the conservation and management of any living resource
within its EEZ to protect it from over-exploitation. 72 These meas
ures, requiring the consideration of the best scientific data avail
able, are designed to maintain or restore harvested species at levels
which produce a maximum sustainable yield while taking into ac
count many factors, including fishing patterns and the interdepen
dence of any stock. 73
As far as fisheries on the high seas are concerned, UNCLOS
III only slightly modified the principle of "freedom of the high
seas."74 UNCLOS III recognized that all states, whether land
65. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
66. See id. art. 33, 21 I.L.M. at 1276.
67. See id. art. 57, 21 I.L.M. at 1280.
68. See Stuart Kaye, Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Convention, 70
AUSTRALIAN L.J. 533, 533 (1996).
69. See id. at 534.
70. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 56(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1281.
71. See id. art. 61, 21 I.L.M. at 1281.
72. See id. art. 61(2), 21 I.L.M at 1281.
73. See id. art. 61(3), 21 I.L.M. at 1281.
74. The principle of "freedom of the high seas" is a customary law principle in
international law. For the principle to arise, a significant number of states must engage
in a practice that is accepted by a majority of states for a significant enough time so that'
the practice becomes accepted as a rule of law. The customary practice of "freedom of
the high seas" began as early as the 18th century and became recognized and affirmed
by both international and domestic courts. See KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 17-18. The
principle was also codified into international law in Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on
the High Seas which states that the high seas are open to all nations and no state may
subject them to its sovereignty. See High Seas Convention, supra note 46, art. 2, 13
U.S.T. at 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82. The Convention listed the freedom of navigation,
the freedom of fishing, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipeline, and the freedom
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locked or coastal, have the freedom to fish on the high seas. 75 UN
CLOS III narrowed this right slightly by stating that when
exercising rights to fish on the high seas, states will be limited by
their treaty obligations and the rights, duties, and interests of other
states laid out within other provisions of UNCLOS IIU6 Freedom
to fish on the high seas is thus no longer "an unfettered economic
right."77
The shift in concentrated fishing from the EEZs to the high
seas has created problems for two types of commercial fisheries:
straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks. 78 Straddling stocks
are fish species that lie partially within an EEZ and partially within
the area of the high seas. 79 They are usually found in areas of rela
tively shallow waters above the continental shelf of a state ex
tending beyond 200 nautical miles. 80 Straddling stocks are
distinguished from highly migratory species that do not remain in
the waters close to the coast, but instead migrate over thousands of
miles, entering the EEZs of several different states and also the
high seas. 81 As stated previously, swordfish are a highly migratory
species.
The articles of UNCLOS III include a provision relating specif
ically to the issue of highly migratory fish species. According to this
provision, states that fish for highly migratory species in a region
must cooperate with any other state that fishes for the species in
that region in order to ensure conservation of the stock. 82 This co
operation for conservation is needed to achieve the objective of op
timum utilization of such species throughout that region, both
within and beyond the EEZ.83 In order to achieve this cooperation,
nations may work directly with one another or through appropriate
to fly over the high seas as rights belonging to states subject to the reasonable regard for
the interests of other nations. See id. art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82.
75. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 87(l)(e), 211.L.M. at 1286-87.
76. See id. art. 116, 21 I.L.M. at 1290.
77. Christopher C. Joyner, Ocean Fisheries, U.S. Interests, and the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 749, 752 (1995).
78. See Kaye, supra note 68, at 534.
79. See id. Straddling stocks are regulated under a separate provision of UN
CLOS III. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 63, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
80. See Kaye, supra note 68, at 534.
81. Cf. Martin, supra note 9, at 767.
82. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. Annex I to the
Convention lists what species are to be considered highly migratory fish stocks. Sword
fish is among those species listed and thus falls under this provision. See id. annex I, 21
I.L.M. at 1329.
83. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.

HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH SPECIES

1999]

15

international organizations. 84 Where such international organiza
tions do not exist, the provision requires that the states harvesting
these highly migratory stocks in the region cooperate to establish
such an association. 85
2.

UNCLOS III and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks

UNCLOS III, while encompassing provisions relating to th~
fishing of stocks both in the EEZ and the high seas, is lacking in its
provisions regarding the conservation and management of highly
migratory species. There are several reasons why this is true;
among those reasons are the following: (1) the parties to the Con
vention provided for the treaty to be adopted as a "package deal;"
(2) the agreement failed to effectively provide for establishment of
fishery management organizations; and (3) the agreement lacked
necessary enforcement provisions.
UNCLOS III was produced as a single treaty, encompassing
over one hundred issues regarding the law of the sea; the topics of
fisheries and scientific research encompass only a few of the issues
addressed. 86 As it was decided that the Convention should be
adopted by consensus if possible, the Convention was likely negoti
ated as a "package deal." Thus, states had to reach compromises
on some of the issues in order to reach agreement on those issues
which were of particular concern to them. The fisheries articles
could not be separated from the articles governing the territorial
sea, continental shelf, and high seas as they were in UNCLOS J.87
As a result, compromises were often achieved through the use of
ambiguous language and the exclusion of precise issues. For exam
ple, issues such as a precise formula for the allocation of fish
catches were left out of the agreement, intended to be dealt with by
subsequent agreements between the states. 88
UNCLOS III also failed to deal effectively with the provisions
84. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
85. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
86. See generally UNCLOS III, supra note 10.
87. Compare UNCLOS III, supra note 10 (containing regulation of several topics
within one document), with High Seas Convention, supra note 46 (regulating only the
high seas), Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 47 (regulating only the territorial
seas), Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 48 (regulating only the continental
shelf), and Fishery Convention, supra note 49 (regulating only the conservation of liv
ing resources).
88. Cf. UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 64, 211.L.M. at 1282 (requiring the crea
tion of regional fishery management organizations to handle issues not clearly resolved
by the Convention).
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relating to the establishment of regional fishery management orga
nizations. The provision relating to the regulation of highly migra
tory fish species states that the parties shall cooperate in the
management of these species either directly with one another or
through an appropriate international organization. 89 If there is no
such organization, the states must then establish such an organiza
tion comprised of those states which are harvesting the same spe
cies within the region. 90
Nothing in the provisions require a state to work through an
international regional organization. In fact, Article 64 lists direct
agreement with another state as an option for dealing with highly
migratory species. 91 As a result, if some of the states involved are
going through regional organizations, while others are making
agreements with each other directly, a discrepancy may exist in the
type of regulatory schemes used and the stringency, or lack thereof,
in those schemes. In some cases, this will lead to stocks that mi
grate between zones being under different management regimes,
some being more protective or less protective of the species than
others. This discrepancy between management regiI,lles reduces the
effectiveness of the overall management and conservation of the
species and may lead to a sharp decline in stocks.
Another major flaw in Article 64 stems from the fact that no
international guidelines were set for the development or operation
of these organizations. 92 As a result, several of the large interna
tional fishery organizations have proven unsuccessful at conserving
the highly migratory fish stocks. 93 One factor contributing to their
failure is the fact that several of the organizations are aimed at very
specific, single-species regimes,94 Often their objectives for con
serving a particular stock are based on the goal of maximizing the
catch of that particular species, not conserving diversity.95 This goal
of maximization can lead to the over-exploitation of other species
89. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
90. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
91. See id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
92. See Mack, supra note 37, at 318.
93. See Edward Miles & William T. Burke, Pressures on the United Nations Con
vention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Prob
lem of Straddling Stocks, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 343 (1989). These large fishery
organizations include the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, which was organ
ized to realize UNCLOS III principles for high seas fishing, and the International Com
mission for the Conservation of Atlantic Thnas, which covers nearly all of the Atlantic
Ocean and regulates swordfish in the North Atlantic. See id. at 344-45.
94. See Iudicello, supra note 63, at 125.
95. See id.
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that may be essential to the survival of the species which the re
gional organizations are trying to protect. This can indirectly de
crease the stocks of the selected species. Another factor leading to
unsuccessful efforts on the part of the international organizations
stems from the fact that states may fail to comply with the general
duty of cooperation or with the conservation and management
measures agreed upon. Also, non-member states may simply ig
nore the regulations set up by the regional organizations. 96
One of the predominant reasons for the general failure of in
ternational regional organizations is the fact that UNCLOS III did
not establish any guidelines or mechanisms for enforcement. 97 As a
result, the regional organizations formed under the agreement did
not, themselves, specify effective enforcement mechanisms, and
have thus had difficulty in obtaining their goal of managing particu
lar fish stocks. 98 In order to ensure successful enforcement of
agreements such as UNCLOS III, procedures must be available for
proper inspection of fishing practices, means must be provided to
ensure that quotas are being adhered to, and there must be an abil
ity to arrest and apply sanctions. 99 UNCLOS III does not provide
for any of these measures. It is thus difficult, if not impossible, for
member states to ensure that other members and even non-mem
bers are adhering to agreed upon standards of conservation and
management. The agreement is weak in its provisions regarding
highly migratory species, and the fact that there are no ample en
forcement measures to ensure that even the basic provision is being
followed further undermines the effectiveness of the treaty.
One example of the ineffectiveness of UNCLOS III, due to
lack of enforcement measures, is the disparity existing between the
accountability of enforcement when the violation is taking place on
the high seas as opposed to within territorial waters. Vessels on the
high seas are accountable to the flag state and the laws imposed
upon them by that state. lOO Flag states thus have the ability alone
to prosecute the offender. This ability undermines any enforcement
provision that an international regional organization may try to en
act for the purpose of allowing the member states to enforce provi
sions against one another .101
See Mack, supra note 37, at 321.
See id.; see also Iudicello, supra note 63, at 124.
98. See Mack, supra note 37, at 321.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 322.
101. See id.
96.

97.
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The ineffectiveness of UNCLOS III in dealing effectively with
the management and conservation of highly migratory fish stocks
has resulted in states enacting unilateral measures to regulate these
stockS.102 One example of such action is found in the recent adop
tion of legislation by Canada prohibiting all fishing of straddling
stocks off its coasts and in the high seas adjacent to Northwest At
lantic Fisheries Organization ("NAFO") territory.103 The legisla
tion also made an attempt to enforce conservation measures
beyond Canada's EEZ by allowing Canada to seize foreign vessels
violating the regulations of NAFO.l04 A continuing legal contro
versy has thus developed with Spain since March 9, 1995, when a
Spanish ship was seized on the high seas under the belief that it was
engaging in illegal fishing. lo5 Spain filed an Application with the
International Court of Justice alleging that the action violated vari
ous principles and norms of international law and has stated that
the dispute with Canada went to "the very principle of the freedom
of the high seas, and moreover, implied a very serious infringement
of the sovereign rights of Spain."l06
Not only does this approach lead to disputes among states and
discourage cooperation, but it also leads to inconsistent fishery
management programs. As discussed previously, this will often
lead to stocks that migrate between zones that are under different
102. See id.; see also Joyner, supra note 77, at 750.
103. See An Act to Amend the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, May 12, 1994,
R.S.c., ch. 14 (1994) (Can.); Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as Amended in 1994,33
I.L.M. 1383 (containing an unofficial version of the original act and its amendments);
see also Mack, supra note 37, at 323; Miles & Burke, supra note 93, at 344-45; Kaye,
supra note 68, at 534.
104. See Mack, supra note 37, at 323.
105. See id.
106. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 9 Hague Y.B. Int'l L. 120, 121 (1996).
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") ruled on the matter on December 4, 1998.
At the time of printing of this Article, the court's ruling had not yet been officially
published. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the court determined that it did not have
jurisdiction to settle the dispute between Canada and Spain. See Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Spain v. Canada) (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocketlied
iecjudgment(s)/iec_ijudgmenC981204_frame.htm>. Under Article 36 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, states may unilaterally formulate, limit, modify, and
terminate their declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the court.
See id. On May 10, 1994, Canada submitted to the court a declaration of submission to
compulsory jurisdiction over all disputes arising after that declaration, with the excep
tion of cases arising out of certain specified circumstances. See id. One of those speci
fied circumstances related to disputes arising out of or concerning conservation and
management of vessels fishing in the NAFO area. See id. The court ruled that the
present dispute between Canada and Spain fell within the exception, and thus the court
had no jurisdiction to decide the case. See id.
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management regimes, some being more protective or less protec
tive of the species than others. This reduces the effectiveness of the
overall management and conservation of the species and has played
a role in leading to the decline in stocks.
UNCLOS III was designed to reverse the apparent disturbing
trend of over-exploitation of fisheries. 107 As such, UNCLOS III
managed to change what was once an unfettered right to fish on the
high seas into a right that is now subject to conditions. UNCLOS
III also established clear geographic zones for coastal state jurisdic
tion off-shore and makes it plain that there is a duty for coastal
states to conserve the fishery resources in those areas. lOB
Most importantly, UNCLOS III addressed the issue of highly
migratory fish stocks for the first time. Its provisions required
states to cooperate with other states regarding the conservation of
these species.1 09 However, UNCLOS III has far from managed to
provide for a comprehensive regime regarding the management of
highly migratory species. The "package deal" way in which the
treaty was adopted resulted in "watered down" provisions for fish
ery management. Much of the regime for conservation was left to
the individual states, to be decided upon in agreements with one
another. Leaving the power to the individual states has created a
wide diversity of conservation and management plans in various re
gions. 110 As a result, highly migratory fish stocks are protected
more in some regions than others, and the effectiveness of conser
vation measures are weakened.
Conservation and management of highly migratory stocks has
also suffered due to the failure and general ineffectiveness of inter
national regional bodies. UNCLOS III did not provide guidelines
for the creation and management of international regional bodies
and, consequently, conservation of the stocks has suffered. In addi
tion, UNCLOS III did not include substantial enforcement meas
ures and guidelines, thus making the work of the regional
management bodies even more difficult. The variation in conserva
tion plans, the weak treaty provisions, and the lack of enforcement
measures have undermined the entire purpose of the fisheries sec
tion of the treaty, that being to conserve the world's fishery
resources.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See
See
See
See

Joyner, supra note 77, at 750.
id.
UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
generally BERRILL, supra note 28.

20

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:5

UNCLOS III merely provides a broad legal framework from
which the individual states are to build upon with the enactment of
their own agreements. However, in order to effectively manage
highly migratory fish that cross regional boundaries, a broad, com
prehensive management scheme is needed. It is possible that the
1995 United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks111 may fill that void. This Article dis
cusses the agreement in Part v.
B.

The International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic.
Tunas

Prior to the UNCLOS III treaty, the only other international
agreement which had an impact on the conservation and manage
ment of the North Atlantic Swordfish was the International Con
vention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas ("Tuna
Convention").u z In 1966, the Tuna Convention was formed among
states that had a common interest in maintaining the populations of
tuna and tuna-like species existing in the Atlantic Ocean at a level
that would produce a maximum sustainable yield. 113 Under the
provisions of the Tuna Convention, an International Commission
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas ("ICCAT") was formed.u 4
ICCAT is the main agency responsible for carrying out the objec
tives of the Tuna Convention, which includes studying the popula
tions of tuna and tuna-like species. llS ICCAT involves over twenty
two nations in the managing of tuna, swordfish, sailfish, and marlin
throughout the Atlantic. 116 ICCAT is among the largest of the in
ternational regional fishery organizations that states can turn to in
order to form an agreement regarding the conservation and man
agement of any highly migratory stock under UNCLOS IIU17
The jurisdiction of the Tuna Convention extends to all waters
111. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12.
112. Thna Convention, supra note 11.
113. See id. preamble, 20 U.S.T. at 2888, 673 U.N.T.S. at 64.
114. See id. art. III(l), 20 U.S.T. at 2889, 673 U.N.T.S. at 64, 66.
115. See id. art. JV(l), 20 U.S.T. at 2890-91, 673 U.N.T.S. at 66, 68.
116. See Martin, supra note 9, at 768. The Convention originally was designed to
regulate tuna in the North Atlantic; however, at a special meeting of the Commission in
1982, the Portuguese delegation proposed that the Convention be amended to include
all of the highly migratory species laid out in UNCLOS III. A protocol to amend the
Convention was agreed upon in Paris in 1984. See id.
117. Article 64 of UNCLOS III allows for the creation of organizations such as
the ICCAT. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
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of the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas. us This jurisdiction pro
vides a regime that encompasses the fish stocks of the Atlantic
Ocean and the adjacent seas to which they may also migrate. It is
important to note that the jurisdiction of the Tuna Convention in
cludes areas of national jurisdiction as well as areas which are high
seas.1 19 However, Article 2 states that nothing in the Tuna Conven
tion shall be considered as affecting the rights, claims, or views of
any of the contracting parties with regard to the limits of the territo
rial waters or the extent of jurisdiction over the fisheries under in
ternational law.1 20 Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Tuna
Convention may extend into the areas under state control only to
the extent those states believe that the Tuna Convention is not in
terfering with the rights and claims that the states have under inter
national law regarding those areas. This limit on the extent of
control in state waters reduces the effectiveness of the Tuna Con
vention in fully protecting highly migratory fish stocks throughout
their entire range.
ICCAT may, based on scientific evidence, make any recom
mendations it believes are needed to maintain the populations of
highly migratory fish species at a level which will produce the maxi
mum sustainable catch. 121 Each recommendation made becomes
effective upon all of the parties six months after the date of
notification. 122
However, the Tuna Convention's effectiveness is undermined
by its provision allowing member states to submit an objection to
the recommendation within that six month period. 123 If a majority
of the member states have lodged objections, the recommendation
will not be binding; if the objections are lodged by more than one
fourth of the members, but not by the majority, the recommenda
tion is effective as to only those states who did not object; and if the
objections are lodged by less than one-fourth of the members, the
recommendation becomes effective for all states unless the ob
118. See Tuna Convention, supra note 11, art. I, 20 U.S.T. at 2888, 673 V.N.T.S. at
64.

119. See id. art. I, 20 U.S.T. at 2888, 673 U.N.T.S. at 64; see also Evelyne Meltzer,
Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: The Nonsustainable
Nature of High Seas Fisheries, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 255, 319 (1994).
120. See Tuna Convention, supra note 11, art. II, 20 V.S.T. at 2888, 673 V.N.T.S.
at 64.
121. See id. art. VIII(I)(a), 20 U.S.T. at 2894, 673 U.N.T.S. at 70, 72.
122. See id. art. VIII(2), 20 U.S.T. at 2895, 673 U.N.T.S. at 72.
123. See id. art. VIII(3), 20 U.S.T. at 2895-97, 673 U.N.T.S. at 72, 74.
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jecting parties reaffirm their objections. 124 The objection procedure
allows certain members to escape from complying with recommen
dations which may conserve and manage the species affected in or
der to ensure that it is not over-exploited. This procedure can
result in the uneven conservation of a highly migratory stock be
cause the stock may migrate between the waters of states that are
following the recommendations for that species and the waters of
states that are not following the recommendations.
Furthermore, ICCAT does not have regulatory power. ICCAT
can only make recommendations for the conservation of the rele
vant species.1 25 Since ICCAT has no authority to enforce its recom
mendations, its effectiveness as a management mechanism depends
not only on its ability to make wise recommendations, but also on
the willingness of the harvesting states to implement them. 126 This
is true for all regional fishery organizations and, as discussed previ
ously, UNCLOS III did not do anything to strengthen the authority
of those organizations. 127
Problems have arisen in the past due to the refusal of key fish
ing nations to sign on to the agreement.1 28 The Tuna Convention's
purpose is further undermined by this refusal. Large fishing nations
have fleets that can exploit a substantial amount of a fishery stock
in several different areas of the ocean, not only in their own juris
dictions, but on the high seas and in the territories of nations with
whom they have agreements. 129 With member nations lacking the
ability to enforce provisions and recommendations of the Tuna
Convention upon non-member states, the future of highly migra
tory fish species is in peril. 130 The lack of enforcement, combined
with the jurisdictional problems and the difficulties regarding the
authority to regulate, creates a convention that has been less than
effective in managing and conserving highly migratory species. In
fact, the ineffectiveness of the Tuna Convention has earned it a
nickname among many experts as being the "international conven
124. See id. art. VIII(3), 20 U.S.T. at 2896-97, 673 U.N.T.S. at 72, 74.
125. See Christopher Weld, Critical Evaluation of Existing Mechanisms for Man
aging Highly Migratory Pelagic Species in the Atlantic Ocean, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
LJ. 285, 288 (1989).
126. See id.
127. See Mack, supra note 37, at 321.
128. See Martin, supra note 9, at 768.
129. See BERRlLL, supra note 28, at 26-27.
130. See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text for a discussion about the
lack of enforcement of provisions and recommendations of the Thna Convention.
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tion to catch all the tuna."131

III.

DOMESTIC REGULATION

In addition to regulation under international law, the United
States has its own domestic legislation regulating fisheries. In 1975,
Congress enacted the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act 132 to imple
ment the provisions of the Tuna Convention. Also, the 1976
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
("Magnuson-Stevens Act") was passed in recognition of increased
fishing pressure and the inadequacies of the present fishery conser
vation management and control. 133 The Magnuson-Stevens Act
was implemented to provide a domestic solution· to the regulation
of fisheries found off the coast of the United States. The Act estab
lished a fishery conservation zone ("FCZ") which extended 200
nautical miles from shore and gave the United States exclusive
management authority. over all living resources within that zone.134
A.

The Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975

The Tuna C~nvention is not self-executing;135 thus, the United
States, after signing and ratifying the document, had to implement
the treaty into its own domestic law system through the enactment
of legislation.136 The United States signed the Tuna Convention on
May 14, 1966, and on March 1, 1967, the United States Senate gave
its advice and consent to ratification.137 The United States did not,
however, implement corresponding domestic legislation until 1975
with the enactment of the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act
(" ATCA").138
Under ATCA, the United States Secretary of Commerce is au
thorized and directed to enforce all of the provisions in the Tuna
131. Iudicello, supra note 63, at 125.
132. Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-70, 89 Stat. 385 (codi
fied as amended at 16 V.S.C. §§ 971-971i (1994 & Supp. III 1997».
133. See Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265,
§ 2, 90 Stat. 331, 331-32 (codified as amended at 16 V.S.c. § 1801 (1994 & Supp. III
1997».
134. See 16 V.S.c. §§ 1811-1812 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
135. See Thna Convention, supra note 11, art. XIV(2), 20 V.S.T. at 2904, 673
V.N.T.S. at 82.
136. See id. art. XIV, 20 V.S.T. at 2904, 673 V.N.T.S. at 82.
137. See id. art. XIV, 20 U.S.T. at 2887, 673 V.N.T.S. at 63.
138. Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-70, 89 Stat. 385 (codi
fied as amended at 16 U.S.c. §§ 971-971i (1994 & Supp. III 1997».
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Convention and in ATCA itself.139 In carrying out these functions,
the Secretary is also authorized to adopt such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of ATCA and
the Tuna Convention. 140 Among the regulations that may be
adopted are the select regulation of anyone or more of the species
covered by the Tuna Convention, the establishment of open and
closed fishery seasons for various stocks, the limitation on the size
and quantity of the catch of a species, and the requirement that
observers be allowed fishing vessels for the purpose of gathering
scientific data. 141
ATCA contains a section providing the United States with en
forcement measures to ensure that the regulations of the Act and
the regulations of the Tuna Convention are met. 142 The enforce
ment provisions, although allowing for greater authority than that
provided for in the Tuna Convention, are only made available to
the United States for enforcement against vessels under United
States jurisdiction. 143 In order to have any enforcement power
against foreign vessels not under the jurisdiction of the United
States, there must be an agreement made specifically between the
United States and the other member state. 144 The enforcement
measures available to the United States for the regulation of vessels
under its jurisdiction and vessels under the jurisdiction with which it
has an agreement include the following: (1) the boarding of a vessel
in order to inspect the vessel and the catch, as well as the ability to
arrest persons aboard the vessel if found in violation; (2) the ability
to arrest, with or without a warrant, any person who violates any
regulation; and (3) the ability to seize, whenever and wherever law
fully found, all fish taken or retained by a vessel in violation of the
ATCA or provisions of the Tuna Convention.1 45
As far as the regulation of swordfish as a highly migratory fish
stock, these enforcement provisions accomplish more in the way of
ensuring conservation and management than the Tuna Convention
itself. However, it is questionable whether this is enough. The Sec
retary of Commerce is authorized to adopt such regulations that are
139. See 16 U.S.C. § 971d(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
140. See id.
141. See id. § 971d(c)(3).
142. See infra note 145 and accompanying text for a list of the enforcement meas
ures available.
143. See 16 U.S.C. § 97lf(a).
144. See id. § 971f(b).
145. See id. § 971f(a).
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necessary to carry out the provisions of the Thna Convention;146
however, there seems to be no requirement that these regulations
go beyond the measures called for by the Tuna Convention. The
Secretary may adopt measures, such as mandatory observers
aboard fishing vessels and limit open seasons for certain fisheries,
but is not required to do so under ATCA.
Additionally, enforcement provisions are available to the
United States to regulate only vessels under its jurisdiction and
those vessels of foreign nations with whom the United States has an
agreement. Although more effective than the Thna Convention in
the way of enforcement, ATCA only provides a method of ensuring
conservation within the areas under the jurisdiction of the United
States and not on the high seas. 147 The only vessels that the United
States may enforce provisions against in those areas are vessels reg
istered in the United States and vessels of agreeing foreign na
tions.148 Any vessel violating a provision under the Tuna
Convention which is under the jurisdiction of another state and op
erating on the high seas cannot be punished. Most often this situa
tion occurs with non-member states fishing on the high seas. As
emphasized previously, highly migratory species are in need of
comprehensive and consistent regulation that spans over their en
tire migratory range. With no way to enforce conservation meas
ures against the entire range of states that may be in violation, the
Tuna Convention remains fairly ineffective.
The ATCA, through recent amendments, requires the Secre
tary to request ICCAT to adopt recommendations necessary for the
conservation of Atlantic swordfish. 149 These provisions require that
the Secretary recommend to ICCAT the "establishment of an inter
national minimum harvest size and a reduction in harvest levels to
the extent necessary to conserve the stock."150 These provisions re
veal that the United States recognizes the urgency of conservation
action for the Atlantic swordfish. The United States, as a coastal
state, has an interest in the long-term management of all highly mi
gratory species due to its dependence on those fisheries within its
EEZ. This interest, however, does not change the lack of enforce
146. See id. § 971d(a).
147. See id.
148. See id. § 971d.
149. See id. § 971d(d)(2); see also Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 207, 104 Stat. 4436, 4462 (amending 16 U.S.c. § 971d so as to
require requests for recommendations).
150. 16 U.S.c. § 971d(d)(2).
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ment within th~ Thna Convention regime, even if these measures
were to be implemented.
In addition to the above-mentioned new development, another
provision recently added to ATCA provides that the Secretary shall
act in cooperation with an advisory committee and requires ICCAT
to "develop and implement a comprehensive research and monitor
ing program to support the conservation and management ... of
highly migratory species."15I The program monitors highly migra
tory fish stocks and assists in defining their range throughout the
Atlantic Ocean, along with population numbers and life-cycle anal
ysis.1 52 This research and monitoring program will aid in support
ing any management or conservation measures taken by ensuring
that the measures will be adopted according to the specific popula
tion size, range, and needs of the species.
B.

Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976

United States federal fishery regulations are provided for in
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act,153 Th~ Magnuson-Stevens Act was passed in recognition of
both increased fishing pressure and the inadequacies of the present
fishery conservation management and control,154 The Magnuson
Stevens Act was thus meant to provide a domestic solution to the
regulation of fisheries found off the coast of the United States. This
solution to the regulation of fisheries was done through the estab
lishment of a fishery co.nservation zone, which extended 200 nauti
cal miles from shore and gave the United States exclusive
management authority over all living resources within that zone. 155
As such, the FCZ is different from the EEZ established under UN
CLOS III, which enabled the United States to extend its 200 nauti
cal mile jurisdiction over all living and non-living resources within
that area. 156
151. Id. § 971i(b); see also Fisheries Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-43, § 303,109
Stat. 366, 383 (1995) (adding the requirement to develop and implement a monitoring
.
program to 16 U.S.c. § 971i).
152. See 16 U.S.c. § 971i(b)(2).
153. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
154. See id. § 1801(a)(2).
155. See id. §§ 1811-1812.
156. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 56, 21 I.L.M. at 1280.
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1. The Role of Fishery Management Councils in the
Conservation of the North Atlantic Swordfish
The Magnuson-Stevens Act established eight regional fishery
Management councils: the New England Council, Mid-Atlantic
Council, South Atlantic Council, Caribbean Council, Gulf Council,
Pacific Council, North Pacific Council, and the Western Pacific
Council. 157 Originally, the function of these councils was to prepare
fishery management plans ("FMPs") with respect to each fishery
within its geographical jurisdiction that might require conservation
and management.1 58 In 1990, however, as a result of the passage of
the Fishery Conservation Amendments, the authority to prepare
FMPs was handed over to the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS"), under the Secretary of Commerce. 159 The councils now
play more of a consultative role. They are responsible for making
recommendations to the Secretary concerning any activity they be
lieve may jeopardize the existence of one or more of the species in
their geographical area. 1OO
Each of the FMPs must contain, among other things, the fol
lowing: (1) conservation and management measures applicable to
United States and foreign fishery vessels which are necessary for
the conservation and management of the species, (2) a full descrip
tion of the fishery, (3) an assessment of the present and probable
future condition of the stock and its measurement of maximum sus
tainable yield, (4) the capacity of the United States fishing vessels
to harvest an optimal yield each year, (5) pertinent data relating to
how the fish are caught and where, and (6) available information
regarding the significance of the habitat to the fishery and the im
pacts changes to the habitat would have upon that species. 161 A
new provision of the Magnuson-Stevens Act now requires that the
FMPs include a fishery impact statement that deals with the likely
effects of the plan or amendment on the participants in the fishery
and on the participants in adjacent areas under the authority of an
other counci1. 162
157. See 16 u.s.c. § 1852(a)(1).
158. See id. § 1851(h).
159. See Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 110,
104 Stat. 4436, 4449 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.c. § 1854 (1994 & Supp. III 1997».
160. See Atlantic Tunas Conservation Act Reauthorization: Hearing on H.R. 779
Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries Management, 103d Congo 82 (1993) [hereinafter At
lantic Tunas Hearing] (testimony of the Center for Marine Conservation).
161. See 16 U.S.c. § 1851(a).
162. See id.
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The Magnuson-Stevens Act did not provide for the regulation
of highly migratory species within the established FCZ of the
United States until amendments were passed in 1990,163 Prior to
1990, the Magnuson-Stevens Act provided solely for exclusive fish
ery management authority over fish in the FCZ that were not
highly migratory species. 164 The Magnuson-Stevens Act did pro
vide, however, that the United States must support and encourage
the implementation and enforcement of all international agree
ments regarding these stocks.1 65 Additionally, the Magnuson-Ste
vens Act stated that the Secretary may provide for the preparation
and implementation of FMPs for each fishery that extends beyond
the geographical jurisdiction of one of the councils. 166 With the
passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the addition of highly
migratory species to those fisheries under the jurisdiction of the
United States, the Secretary was then required to prepare or update
already existing FMPs for those species. 167 However, the creation
of FMPs was extremely slow and the process of creating them for
highly migratory species took several years. 168 The delay was par
tially caused by the change in authority to create FMPs from the
regional organizations to the Secretary, stemming from passage of
the amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1990.169
2.

The Fishery Management Plan for the North Atlantic
Swordfish

In September of 1985, the Fishery Management Councils de
veloped an FMP for the North Atlantic swordfish. 170 Since 1990,
however, the NMFS has had the authority to implement the devel
opment of FMPs, and has thus had the ability to update the North
Atlantic swordfish FMP.l7l Continuous updates have been made to
163. See generally Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101
627, 104 Stat. 4436 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.c. §§ 1801-1882 (1994 & Supp. III
1997)).
164. See 16 U.S.C. § 1813 (1988) (amended 1990).
165. See id. § 1801(b)(2), (4).
166. See id. § 1854(f).
167. See Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 110,
104 Stat. 4436, 4449 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.c. § 1854 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
168. See Atlantic Tunas Hearing, supra note 160, at 77 (testimony of the Center
for Marine Conservation).
169. See Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 110,
104 Stat. 4436, 4449 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.c. § 1854 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
170. See 50 c.F.R. pt. 630 (1997) (setting forth the fishery management plan for
North Atlantic swordfish).
171. See 16 U.S.C. § 1854 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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the FMP for highly migratory species to account for the change in
the United States' authority status over the species: in the interna
tional agreements regulating the stock, in recommendations and
provisions of the ATCA (as it implements the Tuna Convention), in
provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and in changes to the fish
ery stock itself.172 However, these updates were slow to develop
and efforts by the Secretary to exercise responsible management
over highly migratory species was curtailed for some time by Con
gress' failure to appropriate the necessary level of funds to the
Highly Migratory Species Unit established within the NMFSp3
The FMP provisions require that all United States' vessels fish
ing for swordfish in the North Atlantic Ocean, including the Gulf of
Mexico and Caribbean Sea, be issued a permit for such activity.174
The FMP provisions also require that a proper record be kept by
each vessel regarding all swordfish harvesting and containing the
details required by the regulations. 175 Most importantly, the FMP
for North Atlantic swordfish provides an annual update of harvest
limitations and quotas for the stock. The information upon which
the harvest limitations are based is the best scientific data regarding
the abundance of the stock, the present catch and effort in the in
dustry, and recommendations by ICCAT.176 The annual quota is
divided into two semi-annual quotas for each of the six month peri
ods, June 1st through November 30th, and December 1st through
May 31stP7 The NMFS is required to monitor the catch and land
ing statistics, and based on these statistics, to project a date when
the catch will equal the quota, and to announce the closure of the
fishery.178
In October of 1997, consistent with ICCAT recommendations,
NMFS established a United States' quota for the North Atlantic
swordfish industry of 2,464 metric tons dressed weight ("mt dw").179
The 1997 quota was then divided between the directed fishery
172. See DRAFT FMP, supra note 16, at 1-1 to -3.
173. See Atlantic Tunas Hearing, supra note 160, at 78 (testimony of the Center
for Marine Conservation).
174. See 50 C.F.R. § 630.4.
175. See id. § 630.5.
176. See id. § 630.24(d)(1).
177. See id. § 630.24.
178. See id. § 630.25(a)(1).
179. See 62 Fed. Reg. 55,357, 55,358 (1997). "Dressed weight" is the weight of the
carcass after the fish is gutted and the head and fins are removed (dressed weight = 0.75
x whole weight). See Atlantic Swordfish Oversight: Hearing on the Conservation and
Management of Atlantic Swordfish Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Con
servation and the Environment, 101st Congo 110, 111 (1990) [hereinafter Atlantic Sword
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(2,164 mt dw) and the incidental fishery (300 mt dw),180 The di
rected fishery was then divided into separate quotas for longline/
harpoon fishing (2,121.2 mt dw) and drift gillnet fishing (42.8 mt
dW),18I
In December of 1997, however, a rule was passed under the
Endangered Species Act that closed the drift gillnet sector of the
swordfish industry until August of 1998, to avoid jeopardizing the
continued existence of the Northern right whale. 182 Thus, the quota
for the 1997 season was based on those quotas set for longline and
harpoon fishing alone. This number is divided between the two
semi-annual periods, allowing for a quota of 1,060.6 mt dw for each
session. The NMFS used the actual landing numbers for the first
two months of the second session (December 1997 and January
1998) along with projected figures of the landings for February and
March of 1998 (based on the three previous seasons) to determine
that the quota for that session would be reached by March of
1998. 183
In response, NMFS closed the fishery as of March 31, 1998, so
as not to exceed the United States' quotas and risk penalties under
ICCAT.I84 ATCA, which is carrying out the recommendations of
ICCAT, provides that it is a violation to not comply with regula
tions required to be promulgated which establish the quantity of
fish that may be taken within anyone season. 185 Additionally,
ATCA provides that no regulation can be promulgated having the
effect of increasing or decreasing any allocation or quota that has
been agreed upon pursuant to a recommendation by ICCAT.186 A
recommendation is binding on the parties of ICCAT unless they
have specifically objected during the six month period allotted. 187
This system ensures that the United States does not exceed sword
fish quotas under ATCA, which carries out the recommendations of
the ICCAT, or the Magnuson-Stevens Act. However, if the set
fish Hearing] (testimony of William W. Fox, Jr., Assistant Administrator of Fisheries,
NOAA).
180. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 55,358.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 63,467; see also Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.c. §§ 1531-1544
(1994 & Supp. III 1997).
183. See 63 Fed. Reg. 12,687, 12,687 (1998).
184. See id.
185. See 16 U.S.c. § 971d(c)(3)(D) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
186. See id. § 971d(c)(3).
187. See Thna Convention, supra note 11, art. VIII(3), 20 U.S.T. at 2895, 673
U.N.T.S. at 72.
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quotas. are above where they should be for the maximum sustaina
ble yield of the fishery, this effort will not be effective for conserva
tion and management.
The survival of the species is also dependent on the number of
mature females available in the stock for spawning. 188 Although
harvesting is limited by quotas, and the amount of swordfish caught
is being regulated, there is an additional problem with the individ
ual sizes of the fish that make up the harvest. 189 Thus, minimum
size and weight requirements· are needed to ensure that a large
amount of the fishery harvest is not composed of immature fish.
The lower the required weight and size restrictions, the higher the
amount of immature fish that are being exploited, which greatly di
minishes the ability of the stocks to replenish.
The female swordfish grows much more rapidly than the male,
but reaches its maturity at a much later date. Virtually all male
swordfish reach maturity before or at 90 pounds, yet only half of
female swordfish are mature at that weight.1 90 This discrepancy
would not create as much of an impact on the species if the mini
mum weight for capture was set above a level where the majority of
the female swordfish caught would consist of mature adults. How
ever, since minimum weight levels have been set at numbers far
below 90 pounds, the fisheries, while capped by the amount of fish
they may harvest, have been harvesting more and more immature
fish. 191 This harvesting of greater numbers of immature fish has re
sulted in a decrease in the average size of swordfish caught and has
forced stock numbers to decline substantially. The average size of
the commercially caught swordfish has declined from over 266
pounds, dressed weight, in 1963 to 90 pounds, dressed weight, in
1995.192 An average harvested weight in 1995 led to more than
83% of the female swordfish and 36% of the male swordfish caught
by the domestic industry in the North Atlantic consisting of imma
ture fish.193
The ICCAT recommendations and the policies implemented
under the FMPs have failed substantially to recognize this problem
188. See infra text accompanying notes 190-194.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 190-191.
190. See Atlantic Swordfish Hearing, supra note 179, at 112 (testimony of William
W. Fox, Jr., Assistant Administrator of Fisheries, NOAA).
191. See infra note 193 and accompanying text for a discussion of the amount of
juvenile fish caught.
192. See NRDC, supra note 31.
193. See id.
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of the over-harvesting of immature swordfish. In 1997, the mini
mum allowable size for a swordfish taken in the North Atlantic was
29 inches long, with carcass length measured along contour, and 33
pounds, dressed weight. 194 This weight is far below the weight nec
essary for female swordfish to reach a proper maturity level for
spawning. 195 Therefore, regulations regarding the amount of
swordfish that may be .harvested have less of an effect if the landed
swordfish are permitted to be well below the age of maturity.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act has extensive regulations covering
highly migratory fish species and aiming to ensure for their conser
vation and survival,196 However, the swordfish levels are at the
present level for several reasons, a few of which may be attributable
to the Magnuson-Stevens Act itself. FMPs are now the responsibil
ity of the Secretary of Commerce, and as such the regional organi
zations that have jurisdiction over the species have been reduced to
a consultative role. The regional organizations are now responsible
for merely making comments and recommendations concerning any
activity they believe may have an effect on the conservation and
management of species within their geographical jurisdictions,197
This change in authority led to a slowing down of management. 198
Several years passed before the NMFS had established new
FMPs for certain highly migratory species. 199 The lack of funding
for proper scientific and management studies, along with the slow
process of the federal agency action, put highly migratory species at
great risk of inadequate protection. 2 °O It is questionable whether
the movement of the responsibility of management from the re
gional organizations to the Secretary will result in the best manage
ment of the species. The regional councils have the ability to work
together to come up with plans for species that range over two or
more of the geographical areas. 201 The regional councils are closer
194. See 62 Fed. Reg. 55,357, 55,362 (1997).
195. See supra note 190 and accompanying text for a discussion on the maturing
of female swordfish.
196. There are a few specific provisions in the Magnuson-Stevens Act relating
directly to highly migratory species. See 16 U.S.CO §§ 1812, 1822 (1994 & Supp. III
1997).
197. See id. § 1854.
198. See supra note 168-69 and accompanying text for a discussion on the delays
caused by the change in authority over the FMPs.
199. See Atlantic Tunas Hearing, supra note 160, at 78 (testimony of the Center
for Marine Conservation).
200. See id.
201. For a discussion on localizing fishery management, see BERRILL, supra note
28, at 110-12.
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to the regions and are more likely to know first hand of the intrica
cies of regional fisheries. 202 Removal of decision-making to the
Secretary not only burdens the NMFS with several different species
to cover and plan for, but also moves the decision-making to an
agency that is grossly underfunded for this type of venture. 203
IV. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE: THE 1995 CONVENTION AND
MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND
HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS
In the late 1980s, prominent EEZ states saw their major fish
stocks declining, mostly due to domestic harvesting. 204 Since highly
migratory and straddling fish stocks cross EEZ boundaries and high
sea areas, it was clear that stricter management of these species was
needed on the high seas.20S Thus, prominent EEZ states brought
the problem to the attention of the 1992 United Nations Confer
ence on Environment and Development ("UNCED"), or the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro.206 UNCED adopted what is known as
Agenda 21, which encompassed a call for a new intergovernmental
conference to address specifically the deficiencies in the legal re
gime for high seas fisheries under UNCLOS 111.207 The United Na
tions General Assembly endorsed the call for the conference, and
subsequently negotiations began. 208
The conference was convened to elaborate on the framework
provisions of Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS III, relating to strad
dling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, respectively.209
The goals of the conference were to identify and analyze the ex
isting problems related to the conservation and management of
these species, to consider means of improving cooperation among
states, and to formulate appropriate recommendations. 210 Recom
mendations were to be made under the framework of UNCLOS III
202. See id.
203. See supra notes 167-69, 173 and accompanying text.
204. See Alison Rieser, International Fisheries Law, Overfishing and Marine Bi
odiversity, 9 OEO. INT'L ENVIL. L. REv. 251, 265-66 (1997).
205. See id. at 266.
206. See id.; see also Evelyne Meltzer, Global Overview of Straddling and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks: The Nonsustainable Nature of the High Seas Fisheries, 25 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L.J. 255, 323 (1994).
207. See Rieser, supra note 204, at 266.
208. See id.
209. See Martin, supra note 9, at 768.
210. See A Guide to the Issues Before the Conference Prepared by the Chair
man, at 1, U.N. Doc. A1CONF.I64/lO (1993).
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by clarifying and strengthening the relevant rights and duties of
states as they pertain to fishing these stocks on the high seas. 211
The need for a new regime for fisheries on the high seas be
came even more apparent during the conference when Canada took
unilateral action and amended its Coastal Fisheries Protection Act
to allow its vessels to patrol and enforce conservation measures on
the high seas. 212 The urgency of the action showed that an interna
tional agreement was badly needed. The agreement would have to
go further than UNCLOS III and expand on international regula
tions for the highly migratory and straddling fish stocks, but also
provide for a strong regime of enforcement.
One critical element of the conference was the attendance of a
large number of non-governmental organizations ("NGOS").213
The NGOs played a substantial part in maintaining the momentum
of the conference and ensuring that states reached solid, meaningful
agreements regarding the fish stocks on the high seas. 214 In particu
lar, the NGOs were armed with several concepts from the Earth
Summit that they used in order to shape the outcome of the agree
ment. One of these principles was that of the "precautionary prin
ciple," which provided that "where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective' measures to prevent envi
ronmental degradation. "215
The positions of the various fishing nations diverged at the
conference. Many of the DWFNs and NGOs argued that the con
ference should consider conservation and management measures
for the fish stock as a biological unit over its entire range of distri
bution instead of along political boundaries. 216 A debate ensued
regarding whether management and conservation measures should
be compatible throughout all EEZs and with the measures taken on
the high seas. 217 Generally, the coastal states did not want to adopt
211.

See Background Paper Prepared by Secretariat, at 27, U.N. Doc. Ai

CONF.I64IINF/5 (1993).

212. See Rieser, supra note 204, at 267; see also Miles & Burke, supra note 93, at
344-45. See supra notes 103-104 and accomp~nying text for a discussion of Canada's

action.
213. See Reiser, supra note 204, at 267.
214. See A. Charlotte de Fontaubert, The Politics of Negotiation at the United
Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 29
& COASTAL MGMT. 79, 83 (1996).
215. Rieser, supra note 204, at 267.
216. See Meltzer, supra note 119, at 326.
217. See id. .
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such a measure requiring conservation management for fear that it
would compromise their sovereignty over the living resources
within the EEZs as provided for in UNCLOS IIF18
Another hotly debated issue at the conference concerned the
nature of the flag states' responsibilities regarding their vessels on
the high seas as well as the responsibilities regarding vessels belong
ing to other member and non-member states. 219 Under UNCLOS
III, the inability of member states to enforce measures on the high
seas undermined the general purpose and enforcement ability of
the treaty as a whole. 220 Many states felt that they should have the
authority to enforce the provisions of the agreement against foreign
vessels violating the treaty on the high seas and not have the ship be
subject to sanctions, if any, solely by the flag state.
The last major debate at the conference was over the meaning
of the "precautionary principle" and how it would apply to an inter
national fisheries agreement concerning highly migratory fish and
straddling stockS. 221 The debate centered around what it meant to
use a precautionary approach toward management of these species.
The precautionary principle is a hotly debated issue in many
legal realms, especially those regarding the environment, because
the principle requires that action be taken even when the evidence
to support such action is scientifically uncertain. 222 The precaution
ary principle is especially valuable where science may not be able to
show beyond all doubt that environmental degradation will result if
actions are not taken. 223
A.

Fishery Management Under the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement

The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks adopted a Fish Stocks Agreement on
August 4, 1995, in New York. 224 The Fish Stocks Agreement is re
quired to have 30 ratifications or accessions in order to come into
force. 225 As of May 1, 1998, the treaty had 59 signatories and only
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of
enforcement measures.
221. See Meltzer, supra note 119, at 326. See supra notes 79-81 and accompany
ing text for definitions of straddling stocks and highly migratory species.
222. See BERRILL, supra note 28, at 54-55.
223. See id.
224. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12.
225. See id. art. 40, 34 LL.M. at 1572.
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18 parties. 226 The Fish Stocks Agreement applies to the conserva
tion of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks both within the
jurisdiction of the member states and on the high seas. 227 However,
the Fish Stocks Agreement also provides that the rights, jurisdic
tion, and duties of states will not be affected by the Agreement. 228
Coastal states and states fishing on the high seas are required
to adopt measures that will ensure the long-term sustain ability of
the straddling and highly migratory fish stock and promote the ob
jective of optimum utilization of these fisheries. 229 In developing
these measures, the state must ensure not only that the measures
are based on the best scientific data available, but also that they are
based on the precautionary approach to management. 230 This re
quires that the state not use the absence of adequate scientific in
formation as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation
and management measures. 231 The precautionary approach also re
quires that states take into account uncertainties regarding size and
productivity of the stocks, which is especially important when deal
ing with highly migratory fish species. 232 Due to the nature of
highly migratory species, it is very difficult to gather accurate num
bers as to the average size of the fish and how many of the stock
remain because one school of swordfish, for example, can travel
over thousands of miles in its migration patterns. Thus, at any
given time, a state may have a slightly lower, or higher, count of
highly migratory species within its jurisdiction.
The Fish Stocks Agreement takes a step in the direction of pro
viding protection to stocks as biological units over their entire range
of distribution. States have a duty to cooperate in achieving com
226. The parties to the convention and corresponding dates of ratification or ac
cession are as follows: Bahamas (Jan. 16, 1997); Fiji (Dec. 12, 1996); Iceland (Feb. 14,
1997); Iran (Apr. 17, 1998); Italy (Mar. 4, 1999); Maldives (Dec. 30, 1998); Mauritius
(Mar. 25, 1997); Micronesia (May 23, 1997); Namibia (Apr. 8, 1998); Nauru (Jan. 10,
1997); Norway (Dec. 30, 1996); Russian Federation (Aug. 4, 1997); Saint Lucia (Aug. 9,
1996); Samoa (Oct. 25, 1996); Senegal (Jan. 30, 1997); Seychelles (Mar. 20, 1998); Solo
mon Islands (Feb. 13, 1997); Sri Lanka (Oct. 24, 1996); Tonga (Jul. 31, 1996); and the
United States (Aug. 21, 1996). See Status of the Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions ofthe United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of10 December 1982
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Mi
gratory Fish Stocks (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <http://www.un.orglDepts!los!losl64st.htm>.
227. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 3(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1549.
228. See id. art. 4, 34 I.L.M. at 1549.
229. See id. art. 5(a), 34 I.L.M. at 1550.
230. See id. arts. 5(b)-(c), 6(2), 34 I.L.M. at 1550-51.
231. See id. arts. 5(b)-(c), 6(2), 34 I.L.M. at 1550-51.
232. See id. art. 6(3)(c), 34 I.L.M. at 1551.
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patible measures for protection of the stocks and, in doing so, must
consider: (1) the conservation measures of other states; (2) the
measures agreed upon for the high seas; (3) those measures
adopted by regional fishery organizations, including those previ
ously adopted; (4) the biological unity and characteristics of various
stocks; and (5) the dependence of various states on the fishery.
Further, states must ensure that such measures do not result in a
harmful impact on any living marine resources. 233
Due to the lack of guidelines for the operation and manage
ment of regional fishery organizations under UNCLOS III, the
states recognized that there was a need to establish recommenda
tions for the rearrangement-of pre-existing organizations, as well as
a need to establish general and specific standards for the develop
ment of new organizations. 234 Although the regulations of the Fish
Stocks Agreement are international in scope, the majority of its
provisions will be implemented through regional fishery
organizations. 235
Like UNCLOS III, the Fish Stocks Agreement requires states
to pursue the conservation and management of highly migratory
fish stocks, with other states, either directly or through appropriate
sub-regional or regional organizations. 236 However, unlike UN
CLOS III, the Fish Stocks Agreement strengthens the duty of states
to cooperate under these regional organizations and clearly estab
lishes that a state may be barred from fishing in certain areas if it
refuses to do SO.237 The Fish Stocks Agreement also allows state
parties who are members of a regional fisheries organization, or
participants in a similar organization, to take action "in accordance
with international law," including through recourse to regional pro
cedures established for this purpose, to deter vessels that have en
gaged in activities that undermine the effectiveness of the regional
agreement from fishing on the high seas in that region until the
appropriate action is taken by the flag state. 238 . This provides a
strong incentive for states to be involved in negotiations with other
states in the region or with states with which they share a fishery
resource.
When creating a regional or sub-regional organization, or
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. art. 7(2), 34 I.L.M. at 1552.
Mack, supra note 37, at 325-26.
id. at 326.
Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 8(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1553-54.
id. art. 8(1), (4), 34 I.L.M. at 1553-54.
id. art. 20(7), 34 I.L.M. at 1562.
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when negotiating an agreement through such an organization, the
Fish Stocks Agreement provides that the states must consider sev
eral things. The states must agree on what stocks the conservation
agreement shall apply to while taking into account the biological
characteristics of those stocks and the nature of the fisheries in
volved in the harvesting of the stocks. 239 In deciding on the area in
which the agreement will apply, the states must take into considera
tion the socio-economic, geographical, and environmental charac
teristics of that area. 240 Ensuring that states take these
characteristics into consideration is especially crucial when striving
for agreements that are specific to the fishery in that region, as well
as to the specific habitat and unique features that the area may
have. For example, considering the above-listed characteristics
would be crucial when deciding a management and conservation
regime for fisheries that occur in spawning or feeding grounds of a
particular species.
The states must also establish the manner in which the new
agreement will affect or interact with the objectives, operations, or
general role of a previous fishery management organization or
agreement.241 This analysis will ensure that the existing ability of
any fishery management organizations or agreements will not be
undermined, but instead will be enhanced and strengthened by ad
ditional agreements arranged under this treaty.242
Finally, during the agreement process, the states must establish
the mechanisms that will be used to obtain scientific review of the
stocks and to determine whether an advisory body is needed for
this purpose. 243 These are more than just recommendations. The
member states are required to reach an agreement on all of the
above factors while in the process of negotiating the conservation
and management measures that are to be taken. 244 By requiring
these considerations, the agreements that are established between
states will be stronger and more comprehensive, initially, than those
required under UNCLOS 111.245
Since the guidelines are to be agreed upon during the forma
239.
240.
241.
242.
discussion
243.
244.
245.

See id. art. 9(1)(a), 34 I.L.M. at 1555.
See id. art. 9(1)(b), 34 I.L.M. at 1555.
See id. art. 9(1)(c), 34 I.L.M. at 1555.
In this regard, the Fish Stocks Agreement differs from UNCLOS III. For a
of the problems created by UNCLOS III, see supra Part II.A.2.
See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 9(1)(d), 34 I.L.M. at 1555.
See id. art. 9, 34 I.L.M. at 1554-55.
See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the weaknesses of UNCLOS III.
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tion period,246 states are encouraged to join in the negotiation pro
cess initially or risk being bound by an agreement that is either not
satisfactory to them or which excludes them from the fishery alto
gether. Under Article 17 of the Fish Stocks Agreement, a state that
is not a member of a regional fisheries organization or a participant
in such organization, and does not otherwise agree to apply the con
servation and management measures provided by such organiza
tion, is not discharged from the obligation to cooperate in the
conservation and management of highly migratory and straddling
stocks. 247 This provision providing for cooperation by non-member
states was not available under UNCLOS III, where non-member
states to the regional agreement were fishing in areas of the high
seas. Under UNCLOS III, a state was only obligated by treaty obli
gations, rights, and duties laid out in other provisions of the
agreement.248
After initial cooperation, the states are required to continue
their obligations. The Fish Stocks Agreement provides a list of re
quirements consisting of those matters the states must agree on in
order to fulfill their obligations of cooperation. 249 These obliga
tions include the adoption and implementation of any generally rec
ommended international minimal standards for the responsible
conduct of fishing operations. 25o These international minimum
standards supply the basis for a conservation and management level
that can be applied consistently throughout the range of each
species.
B.

Enforcement Provisions Under the Fish Stocks Agreement

While the Fish Stocks Agreement will increase the effective
ness of the regional management organizations, the ultimate suc
cess of the agreement is dependent on its enforcement provisions.
The Fish Stocks Agreement addresses many of the problems that
UNCLOS III had with compliance and enforcement. 251 During the
conferences prior to its adoption, there was an intense debate as to
what enforcement powers the agreement should provide to the re
gional organizations. 252 Coastal states wanted the regional organi
246. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 9, 34 I.L.M. at 1554-55.
247. See id. art. 17(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1559.
248. See UNCLOS III, supra note 10, art. 116, 21 I.L.M. at 1290.
249. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 10, 34 I.L.M. at 1555-56.
250. See id. art. lO(c), 34 I.L.M. at 1555.
251. See Mack, supra note 37, at 328.
252. See id. at 329; see also Meltzer, supra note 119, at 326.
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zations to have stronger enforcement powers, while the DWFNs
wanted enforcement left up to the flag state. 253 The Fish Stocks
Agreement ultimately attempted to balance the opposing interests
while, at the same time, ensuring that regional organizations were
given more enforcement powers than had been provided under
UNCLOS IIJ.254
Like UNCLOS III, the Fish Stocks Agreement requires states
to pursue the conservation and management of highly migratory
fish stocks, with other states, either directly or through appropriate
sub-regional or regional organizations. 255 However, the Fish Stocks
Agreement strengthens the duty of states to cooperate under these
regional organizations and clearly establishes that a state may be
barred from fishing in certain areas if it refuses to cooperate. 256
Further, as discussed previously, the Fish Stocks Agreement allows
state parties who are members of a regional fisheries organization
or participants in such an organization to take action "in accord
ance with international law,"257 including through recourse to re
gional procedures established for this purpose, to deter vessels that
have engaged in activities that undermine the effectiveness of the
regional agreement from fishing on the high seas in that region until
the flag state takes appropriate action. 258 This provision allowing
members of a regional fishery organization to have enforcement
against both members and non-members provides a strong incen
tive for states to be involved in negotiations with other states in the
region with whom they share a fishery resource.
Conversely, under UNCLOS III, the inability of member states
to enforce measures on the high seas undermined the general pur
pose and enforcement ability of the treaty as a whole. 259 States be
lieve they should have the authority to enforce the provisions of the
agreement against foreign vessels and foreign nationals violating
the treaty on the high seas and not have the ship be subject to sanc
tions, if any, solely by the flag state.
In addition, member states had difficulty enforcing the provi
sions of UNCLOS III against non-member states fishing in the ter
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
ment on

See Mack, supra note 37, at 329.
See id.
See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 8(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1553-54.
See id. art. 8(1), (4), 34 I.L.M. at 1553-54.
See id. art. 20(7), 34 I.L.M. at 1562.
See id. art. 20(7), 34 I.L.M. at 1562.
See supra ·notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of enforce
the high seas under UNCLOS III.
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ritory of the regional organization or the high seas. 260 Now, the
territory of the regional organizations may include areas of the high
seas, not just areas under the jurisdiction of states. 261 Therefore,
the Fish Stocks Agreement provides authority to the member states
to successfully deter unregulated fishing. 262 When a member state
has reasonable grounds to believe that a vessel belonging to a non
member state is engaged in the activity of unauthorized fishing, the
member state is allowed to investigate and possibly even seize the
vessel if deemed necessary.263 Article 21 of the Fish Stocks Agree
ment allows for member states to board and inspect, according to
procedures set by the regional organization, foreign fishing vessels,
even if they are not members of the regional organization, in order
to ensure compliance with conservation and management proce
dures. 264 If it is clear after boarding and inspecting the vessel that a
violation has been committed, the inspecting state may secure evi
dence and notify the flag state of the violation. 265
If a "serious violation" is found, the inspectors are allowed to

stay on board the vessel, secure evidence, and, where appropriate,
bring the vessel to the nearest port. 266 A serious violation is de
scribed as one of the following: (1) fishing without a valid license;
(2) failing to maintain accurate records of catch and catch-related
data; (3) fishing in a closed area, during closed season or at time
when quota has already been exceeded; (4) using prohibited fishing
gear; (5) falsifying or concealing markings; (6) concealing, tamper
ing with, or disposing of evidence relating to an investigation; or (7)
other such violations as decided by regionaf agreement. 267 Addi
tionally, the flag state is required to ensure that its vessels are in
compliance with all regional and sub-regional conservation and
management measures for highly migratory and straddling fish
stocks. 268
Although the Fish Stocks Agreement clarifies and strengthens
the duties of a member state in enforcing management and conser
vation agreements, the treaty still leaves the primary responsibility
260. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of enforce
ment problems under UNCLOS III.
261. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 3, 34 I.L.M. at 1549.
262. See id. art. 3, 34 I.L.M. at 1549.
263. See id. art. 21, 34 I.L.M. at 1563-65.
264. See id. art. 21(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1563.
265. See id. art. 21(5), 34 I.L.M. at 1563.
266. See id. art. 21(5), 34 I.L.M. at 1563.
267. See id. art. 21(11), 34 I.L.M. at 1564-65.
268. See id. art. 18, 34 I.L.M. at 1559-61.
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of ensuring vessel compliance with the flag state.269 Leaving the
primary responsibility of ensuring vessel compliance with the flag
state was perceived, by the coastal states, to be one of the weak
nesses of UNCLOS III, although the DWFNs preferred this method
of regulation. 270 To balance these interests, the Fish Stocks Agree
ment strengthened and clarified the duties of the flag state. For
example, the Fish Stocks Agreement requires that flag states en
force conservation measures regardless of where the violations oc
CUr. 271
Additionally, flag states now have a duty to ensure
immediate investigation of any violation and to report the findings
of that investigation to the appropriate regional organization having
authority over the area in which the violation occurred. 272 Further,
if a violation is found, the flag state is required to prohibit the vessel
from fishing on the high seas until sanctions can be decided by the
flag state. 273 Moreover, flag states still retain the ability to impose
their own sanctions in accordance with the laws of their state upon
the vessel in violation. 274 Thus, while member states have more au
thority to enforce the provisions of the regional management orga
nizations, the flag states still have the primary authority in the
investigation and sanctioning process. 275 Therefore, there is always
a risk that investigations will not be thorough and sanctions will not
be strong enough.276
The Fish Stocks Agreement has, nonetheless, provided
stronger enforcement measures against other member states in vio
lation of regional management agreements. When a member state
alleges that another member has committed a violation, the flag
state has the obligation to investigate the allegation. 277 More im
portantly, states may board and investigate the vessel, its license,
gear, records, and any fish or fishery products it may have on
board. 278 The member state may actually suspend the foreign ves
sel's authorization to fish and demand that it return to port if the
foreign vessel refuses to allow boarding for inspection. 279 Regional
269.
270.
271.
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id. art. 18, 34 I.L.M. at 1559-61.
Mack, supra note 37, at 322.
Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 19(1)(a), 34 I.L.M. at 156l.
id. art. 19(1)(b), 34 I.L.M. at 1561.
id. art. 19(1)(e), 34 I.L.M. at 156l.
id. art. 21(13), 34 I.L.M. at 1565.
Mack, supra note 37, at 33l.
id.
Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 12, art. 19(1)(b), 34 I.L.M. at 1561.
id. art. 22(2), 34 I.L.M. at 1566.
id. art. 22(4),34 I.L.M. at 1566.
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organizations may adopt stronger standards than those provided by
the Fish Stocks Agreement regarding the boarding and inspection
of vessels in violation; however, they may also limit those
provisions. 28o
Although the Fish Stocks Agreement is not yet in force,281 the
treaty is clearly a big step in the right direction of conserving highly
migratory and straddling stocks. The effectiveness of the treaty will
remain to be seen, but it is clear that it provides a better regulatory
scheme than that provided under UNCLOS III. The Fish Stocks
Agreement comes at a time when the highly migratory fish stocks
are at an all-time dangerous low. Although a step in the right direc
tion, the Fish Stocks Agreement may be too late to have a substan
tial impact on the rapidly declining stocks.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Internationally and domestically, the regulation of the conser
vation and management of North Atlantic swordfish appears to be
substantial. However, as shown in this analysis of each individual
regulatory scheme, there are several areas where improvements
need to be made. 282 Successful fishery management requires ade
quate information, efficient administration, effective enforcement,
mandatory compliance, regular evaluation, and constant plan devel
opment. 283 The success of each one is dependent on the success of
the others.
The North Atlantic swordfish, as a highly migratory species, is
in need of a conservation regime that encompasses all of the above
attributes and which would be effective for the entire range of spe
cies. 284 An effective conservation plan requires international coop
eration of all the states engaged in the fishing of the North Atlantic
swordfish to implement management and conservation procedures
that apply not only on the high seas, but also within the EEZs of
each state. Anything less will result in an uneven conservation
scheme where the species is less protected in certain parts of its
280. See id. art. 21(2), (15), 34 I.L.M. at 1563, 1565.
281. See supra notes 228-229 and accompanying text for a discussion of the re
quirements for the Fish Stocks Agreement to come into force.
282. See supra Parts II-IV.
283. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the requirements for successful fish
ery management.
284. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need for
a comprehensive regime for swordfish.
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migratory path than in others. 285 As evidenced by present num
bers, an ineffective conservation program in anyone area can un
dermine the entire scheme of protection and put the species at risk
for over-exploitation. 286
UNCLOS III, while the first major international agreement to
create jurisdictional and regulatory zones for fishery resources, was
ineffective at covering the conservation of highly migratory spe
cies. 287 Furthermore, UNCLOS III only slightly modified the prin
ciple of "freedom on the high seas," and has thus been inadequate
at providing even minimal protection of highly migratory species,
either within EEZs or on the high seas. 288
Regional organizations established under UNCLOS III have
generally failed to provide any substantial protection of the spe
cies. 289 The lack of guidelines for the establishment and operation
of such regional organizations within UNCLOS III had a significant
influence on this outcome. Many of these organizations concen
trated on single species management and failed to take into account
the interdependency of species on other .stocks.290 The predomi
nant reason for the failure, however, is the lack of guidelines for
establishing enforcement provisions. 291 The objective of the treaty
to conserve and manage fish stocks is sufficiently undermined by
non-adherence by member and non-member states and by the
adoption of unilateral measures by some major fishing countries. 292
In order to re-establish the conservation and management of
fishery stocks under UNCLOS III, action needs to be taken to reor
ganize and provide management of all the regional fishery organi
zations that were established under the treaty.293 Further action
also needs to be taken to ensure consistency throughout the regions
285. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the effects of less than comprehen
sive conservation schemes for highly migratory species.
286. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the possibility of over-exploitation.
287. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of how UNCLOS III is ineffective for
conservation of highly migratory species.
288. See supra Part II.A.2 for an explanation of the ineffective modifications of
UNCLOS III.
289. See supra Part 1I.A.2 for a discussion of how regional organizations estab
lished under UNCLOS III have failed to protect highly migratory species.
290. See Iudicello, supra note 63, at 124.
291. See Mack, supra note 37, at 318.
292. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of non-adherence and the adoption of
unilateral measures.
293. See supra Part I1.A.2 for a discussion of regional fishery organizations under
UNCLOS III.
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regarding regulations on the same species. 294 These deficiencies in
UNCLOS III are addressed adequately in the recent Fish Stocks
Agreement, which seeks to reaffirm the regulatory procedures
needed to protect the highly migratory species. 295
The 1966 International Convention for the Conservation of At
lantic Tunas is also insufficient to deal adequately with the manage
ment of the swordfish. 296 Any recommendation proposed to
ICCAT, an organization formed under the Convention, regarding
the management and conservation of species may be objected to by
one or more of the parties, and thus become inapplicable to that
party or to all parties, depending upon the number of parties ob
jecting.297 ICCAT does not even possess regulatory power; rather,
the organization depends on the willingness of the states to imple
ment its recommendations. 298
ICCAT recommendations on quotas should be able to be re
duced if the United States wants to implement lower quotas. Pres
ently, however, the Atlantic Thnas Convention Act and the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
prevent this action in their language. 299 Still, other actions are
available to the United States, which are consistent with ICCAT
recommendations. For example, time and area closures can be im
plemented to protect key nursery areas and spawning grounds of
swordfish. One such action under consideration has been closing
nursery grounds to fishing within the United States' jurisdictional
zone at times of the year when juvenile fish congregate. 300 Such a
closing of the nursery grounds would help to protect juvenile
swordfish, which are vital to the future of the swordfish stocks in
the North Atlantic.
A principal criticism of both the international and domestic
management regime is that both rely primarily upon a minimum
size limit rather than implementing "variable season closures," as
recommended by fishery management cQuncils, or "time and area
294. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the current inconsistencies between
regions.
295. See supra Part IV for a discussion of the Fish Stocks Agreement.
296. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the inadequacies of ICCAT in dealing
with swordfish.
297. See supra note 123 and accompanying text for provisions regarding objec
tion under ICCAT.
298. See supra note 123-126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of
regulatory control under ICCAT.
299. See NRDC, supra note 31.
300. See id.
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closures" as authorized by the 1990 recommendations made by IC
CAT.30l The 1990 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act pro
vided for the management of highly migratory fish species under
the conservation requirements of the Act; however, the ambiguity
regarding the relationship between ATCA and the Magnuson-Ste
vens Act continues to provide a means for opting to regulate under
the least restrictive means available. 302
In addition, the minimum size of catchable swordfish should be
increased to a weight which is closer to those corresponding with
mature females in the stock.303 The minimum weight, as it stands
now, is significantly below the reproductive size of the female
swordfish. 304 As such, the future viability of the stock is at stake
because the population cannot reproduce fast enough to keep
ahead of its exploitation. 305 Increasing the minimum size and
weight requirements would also help to discourage fishing in areas
where juvenile swordfish are prevalent. 306
The United States should concentrate more of its efforts to
conserve and manage highly migratory species on an international,
rather than a domestic, level.307 Concentrating more efforts on an
international level would require the United States to be a more
active member in ICCAT.308 As such, the United States could be
come a leader in the implementation of tougher regulations which
would encourage other states to follow. Additionally, the United
States should encourage ICCAT nations to adopt the 1995 Fish
Stocks Agreement,· which implements the precautionary approach
to fishery management. 309 Moreover, the United States should en
courage ICCAT to adopt the Fish Stocks Agreement's conservation
requirements regarding highly migratory and straddling fish
301. See id. at 79.
302. See id.
303. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion on the maturity of the female sword
fish and the present minimum size of a swordfish allowed to be caught.
304. See supra notes 190 and 194 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
minimum size of swordfish allowed to be caught and the point at which a female sword
fish reaches maturity.
305. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the declin
ing numbers of swordfish stocks.
306. See supra Part I for a general discussion on the status of swordfish stocks.
307. See supra Part II for discussion of international regulation of swordfish.
308. See supra Part II.B for a discussion on ICCAT.
309. See supra Part IV for a discussion on the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement. In
addition, see supra notes 233-235 and accompanying text regarding the precautionary
principle of the Fish Stocks Agreement.
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stocks. 310
Domestic regulation of the highly migratory species is impor
tant. However, domestic regulation focuses on the species only
when it is within United States' jurisdiction and, as such, is not ef
fectively managing and conserving the species for the long term. 311
Therefore, on the domestic level, the Magnuson-Stevens Act should
be amended to create stricter guidelines for the management and
operation of the regional fishery management councils established
under its provisions. 312 Additionally, the control of FMPs should
be returned to the regional councils from the Secretary of Com
merce. 313 With the return of power to the regional councils, regula
tions would be needed to set forth strict requirements for the
councils to follow so that the conservation and management of
these fish stocks will be constantly updated and will adequately re
flect the urgency of the current situation. 314
CONCLUSION

Highly migratory fish stocks in the North Atlantic are in great
peril. Overfishing has depleted the stocks and allowed for greater
numbers of juvenile fish to be harvested. The goal of long term
conservation of species, such as the North Atlantic swordfish, re
quires that stringent international and domestic regulations be
adopted and followed. All states that have a stake in these fisheries
should adopt the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement in order to further
this goal. The Fish Stocks Agreement is, however, only a step in the
process of complete fishery management of those species. The
swordfish stocks are dwindling dramatically with every harvesting
season that passes. The time for action is now, before it is too late.

310. See supra Part ILB for a discussion of ICCAT, and supra Part IV for discus
sion of the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement.
311. See supra Part III for discussion of domestic regulation under ATCA and
the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
312. See supra Part IILB.1 for a discussion of the fishery management councils
under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
313. See supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text for a discussion of the au
thority for preparing FMPs being handed over to the Secretary of Commerce from the
regional councils.
314. See supra Part III.B.1 for discussion of the regional fishery councils.

